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The Invisible Branch: Funding Resilient Courts
Through Public Relations, Institutional Identity,
and a Place on the "Public Radar"
Chief Justice Paul J. De Muniz'
I. THE JUDICIARY CANNOT WAIT FOR THE OTHER BRANCHES TO COME TO
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL SENSIBILITIES
State courts across the country are struggling under prolonged budget
cuts severe enough to jeopardize judicial infrastructure and constitutional
democracy. References to tipping points, breaking points, and points of no
return pepper conversations on the topic. Unfortunately, the rollercoaster
of budget cuts and funding crises is nothing new to the judiciary.
For years, state courts across the nation have been scraping by on the
much reduced level of support they get from state and local governments.'
The financial crisis of 2008 has further strained court budgets and that
strain "is being felt in courthouses and communities across the country."3
Because of the unprecedented nature of the prevailing economic climate,
history's talent to inform and instruct is limited. Nevertheless, one message
is clear: judicial efforts to avoid ongoing cuts have not and are not working.
For instance, direct appeals to the legislature have not brought lasting relief,
and "co-equal third branch"4 and "constitutionally adequate funding"5
arguments have gone largely unheeded. It is not that the arguments lack
validity or that the judiciary lacks constitutional entitlement. It is simply
that such justifications seem to fall flat when there is not enough money to
go around.
I Chief Justice, Oregon Supreme Court. The author acknowledges the significant contri-
butions of Kimberley Mansfield, J.D. Candidate, Willamette University College of Law, 2013,
and Oregon Supreme Court Extern, in the preparation of the article.
2 John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 27, 201 1,
atAi8.
3 Id.
4 See Ed Collister, Are We Not Treating the Judiciary as the "Ugly Duckling" of Government?, 9
KAN. J.L. & PuB. POCY 302,313-15 (1999), for a brief exposition of the "co-equal third branch"
argument. Collister argues that the lack of funding for the judiciary indicates its inequality
compared to the legislative and executive branches. Id
5 See generally Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent
JudicialPowers, 52 MD. L. REv. 217 (1993), for an exposition of the "constitutionally adequate
funding" argument. Jackson argues that the necessity of funding the judicial branch is implicit
in its establishment under federal and state constitutions. Id. at 223-24.
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It is no surprise then, that the last two presidents of the American Bar
Association have made state court funding their top priority. In 2010 the
American Bar Association launched the Task Force on Preservation of the
Justice System to study the debilitating effects of the current funding crisis
as well as prospective interventions.6 Fresh strategies emerging both from
the Task Force and from individual state judiciaries reflect three key points:
first, internal belt tightening alone cannot offset the effects of perpetually
plummeting judicial budgets; second, the road to sufficient and systematic
judicial sustenance is through the legislature; and third, effective and
enduring access to those legislative purse strings will require broad and
lasting public support.
So far, however, while many recently minted strategies place deserved
and welcomed emphasis on outreach, communication, and education,
those strategies do not contemplate the creation of enduring public-
stakeholder involvement. Because the present funding dilemma is chronic,
escalating, and constitutionally charged, it will not be solved by an ad hoc,
crisis-by-crisis type of buy-in. Instead, an odds-on approach will envision
public buy-in on an institutional plane and will call it a relationship. Public
awareness alone will not be enough. The goal must be public relations.
The critical distinction between public awareness and public relations is
the difference between merely disseminating information and partnering in
its understanding and incorporation. Accomplishing the latter will depend
on how the judiciary chooses to identify itself, conduct its affairs, and to
what level those notions will pervade the everyday public consciousness. A
wisely selected identity will be key. When the public is able to anchor buy-
in to that institutional presence instead of a single issue, doors and minds
will open toward understanding the judiciary's crucial role, the gravity of
what is at stake, and the necessity for changes that will facilitate resilient
courts and, ultimately, resilient justice.
This article examines the sensitivity and self-inquiry involved in
such a proposition. It begins by examining the growth of the judiciary
in the constitutional context of separation of powers, and reviews the
present crisis and subsequent effects on judicial funding and institutional
effectiveness. Finally, the article focuses on the shortcomings of stop-gap
thinking and, alternatively, how the capacity for public relations to enhance
judicial prospects will turn on the establishment of a favorable institutional
identity.
6 Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, Incoming American Bar Association President to Appoint
Ted Olson & David Boies to Task Force on Justice System (Aug. 6, 201o), available at http://
www.abajournal.com/files/olson.pdf; Task Force on Preservation of the Justice System, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/justice center/taskforceon-the-preservationof_the_
justice-system.html (last visited Dec. 30, 201 i) (providing current information on the Task
Force's actions).
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II. THE JUDICIARY AS AN INSTITUTION REQUIRING BUDGETARY
PROTECTIONS IS A RECENT CONCEPT
It is helpful to examine the growth of the American judiciary in the
context of the separation of powers doctrine. Of particular relevance is why,
despite a rich history in this country of embracing the theory of divided
government, state judiciaries fail to be more insulated from funding
decisions made by the other two branches of government.
At the heart of the separation of powers doctrine is a mistrust of human
nature.7 Montesquieu, who is widely credited with first articulating the
divided government theory,8 wrote, "[w]hen the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates
... there can be no liberty."9
The solution, according to John Locke and James Harrington, was to
divide government into different branches. 0 However, those early models
of government did not include a judicial branch.1 Montesquieu, Locke,
and Harrington all conceptualized tripartite divisions of power, yet none
of the three philosophers posited that the judiciary should be a co-equal
branch of government.12
The judiciary, however, gained new prominence under the United
States Constitution. Given their experience with British rule, the Framers
embraced the same fear of power as the philosophers who preceded them.
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition," James Madison wrote in
The Federalist No. 51. 3
Yet, while the Framers opined that the judiciary should be a co-equal
branch of government, 4 they did not view the judiciary as an institution
and thus did not design protections with such a model in mind.15 The
motivation to protect the judiciary derived from two main phenomena. 6
First, the framers were concerned about a lack of judicial independence
7 Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 373-74
(1976).
8 Philip B. Kurland, The Rise andFall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MIcH. L.
REv. 592, 595 (1986).
9 Levi, supra note 7, at 373-74 (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748),
reprinted in 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 70 (Hutchins ed., 1952)).
10 See Kurland, supra note 8, at 595.
I Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 598 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-48 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke
ed., 1961)).
14 See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 8o COLUM. L. REv. 671,671
(198o).
15 Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence Can Inherent Powers Protect
State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 Ky. L.J. 979, IOO5-°6 (2004).
I6 See id. at 99
o .
20 11-2612]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
because colonial judges were under direct control of the king and had no
salary protection. 7 Second, the framers were concerned with the power
that state legislatures had over their respective judiciaries. These fears
were flamed by a series of legislative encroachments on judicial activity,
especially in Rhode Island, in which, according to James Madison, "the
Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced, and
others substituted, by the Legislatures who would be willing instruments of
the wicked [and] arbitrary plans of their masters." 8 Madison subsequently
lobbied for the judiciary to be a co-equal branch of government.1 9 He
was joined by Patrick Henry and John Marshall, who also pushed for an
independent judiciary, which would be an able guard against the extra-
constitutional actions of other branches of government."0
As Michael Buenger noted, "[tihe Framers . . . rejected a judiciary
whose ... judgment - was dangerously subject to unwarranted intrusions
by the executive and legislative branches, particularly with regards to the
decisional process.""1 To protect the decisional process the framers placed
two relevant clauses in the United States Constitution: The Good Behavior
Clause," which provided for the lifetime appointment of federal judges
during good behavior; and the Compensation Clause, 3 which keeps judicial
salaries from being reduced. 4 Hamilton highlighted the importance of
judicial salary protections, contending that "[n]ext to permanency in office,
nothing can contribute more to the independence of judges than a fixed
provision for their support." 25 Hamilton argued that "a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will.
2
1
6
The framers, however, still did not perceive a need to protect the
institutional independence of the judiciary. Clauses protecting judicial
budgets, therefore, remained absent from the constitution. At that time,
however, the majority of state judiciaries were comprised of locally elected
judges that were funded by local municipalities. 7 State legislatures
generally paid little attention to the administrative structure of judiciaries
because state appellate courts were often not funded from state treasuries, s
17 Id. at 990, 992-93.
I8 Id. at 998-99 (alterations in original).
19 See id.
20 See Kaufman, supra note 14, at 687 n.98.
21 Buenger, supra note 15, at Ioo9-Io.
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
23 Id.
24 Jackson, supra note 5, at 225.
25 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TH'E FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 531 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961)).
z6 Id. (emphasis omitted).
27 Buenger, supra note 15, at 1012-13.
28 Id. at ioi6.
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and trial courts largely controlled their own administrative structures. 9 In
the absence of an institution to safeguard, the framers of both the state and
federal constitutions did not seek to fortify the institutional independence
of the judiciary.
For most of our history, state judiciaries simply were not the complex
institutions they are today. However, over time administrative structures
have evolved significantly and the workload for state judiciaries has
skyrocketed. This escalation can be credited to the coupling of the Framers'
deliberate division of power among co-equal branches of government to
protect personal liberties, and the Bill of Rights, the primary mechanism
through which those liberties are protected.31 The job of ensuring that
individual rights are not infringed has fallen to the courts, generating more
cases and adding to the growth of state judiciaries.
3
Additionally, the increased complexity and importance of cases handled
by state judiciaries has increased the administrative support required to
enable their adjudication.3 3 As Buenger notes,
The current debate on the level of the judiciary's independence [has
to do] with the evolving and expanding role of state courts in American
society. With abortion, euthanasia, environmental issues, election
controversies, and even the legislative process itself, state judiciaries
have become the fora for some of the most vexing political and social
issues of our time. Unlike the past, state courts are finding themselves
at the center of, and not the periphery of, many divisive political
maelstroms.34
The structure of state judiciaries also has changed. State judiciaries
are no longer comprised of an attenuated collection of individual
judges. Rather, today's state court systems are largely administered by
state supreme courts, which, in a growing number of states, exercise
administrative control over the entire judicial branch.3" Reviews are mixed
as to whether "unified" court systems actually produce either positive or
negative resuls. 6 Nevertheless, one thing is clear: as state courts systems
have consolidated and unified, they have transformed into institutions with
their own identities.
37
With the change in structure have also come changes in funding. Even
though the cost of funding courts has not significantly increased, the shift
29 Id. at 1014.
30 See id. at 1012-13.
31 See Kurland, supra note 8, at 604, 611.
32 See id. at 6I.
33 See Buenger, supra note 15, at lol i.
34 Id. at 1019-20 (footnotes omitted).
35 Seeid. at 1017-18.
36 John K. Hudzik & Alan Carlson, State Funding of Trial Courts: What We Know Now,
JUDGES' J., Summerzoo4, at I1, 12-13.
37 Buenger, supra note 15, at 1o19-zo.
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to unified judiciaries and away from local funding has caused the judicial
budget at the state level to increase substantially.38 Subsequently, judicial
budgets have become a target for state legislatures seeking to cut spending
in tough economic times.39
The process through which state judiciaries receive their funding also
has evolved. Today, state legislatures and increasingly state executive
branches are involved with setting judicial budgets' 0 In several states the
governor drafts an initial budget,41 which then forms the floor from which
the legislature makes further cuts.
Finally, as part of the push-back against legislative power, some states
have limited the frequency and duration of legislative sessions.4" Reduced
sessions of similarly underfunded legislatures mean that state bureaucracies
handle many complex budget issues; and these bureaucracies often
inadequately account for the constitutional mandate placed on judiciaries
to administer justice impartially, completely, and without delay.43
As state judiciaries have transformed into a unified organization, the
judiciary has developed its own institutional identity. That self-perception
has caused judiciaries to come together and begin to work to preserve their
independence. 44 Still, salary and tenure protections remain the judiciary's
only constitutional protections; meanwhile, legislatures reserve control
over judicial budgets, the creation of court rules, and the structure of the
courts.
45
Despite the judiciary's escalating institutional identity, so long as it
remains at the fiscal mercy of its counterparts, inter-branch friction will
regrettably continue and - particularly in economically contentious times -
will remain unsurprising and, ultimately, counterproductive.
III. RECESSIONS, RESPONSES, AND RESULTS (OR LACK THEREOF):
THE FUNDING CRISIS IS NO NOVELTY BUT ITS DEPTH IS A MATTER
OF FIRST IMPRESSION
The United States has experienced thirteen recessions since the Great
Depression.46 Following years of continuous budget cuts, the recession of
38 Id. at 1028-29.
39 See id. at 1029.
40 See id. at 1028-29; G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions,
59 N.Y.U. ANN. SUav. AM. L. 329, 339 (2003).
41 Tarr, supra note 40, at 339.
42 Id. at 335.
43 See id. at 339; Buenger, supra note 15, at IOi8-19; see, e.g., OR. CONsT. art. I, § 1o (con-
stitutional mandate requiring courts to administer justice).
44 See Buenger, supra note 15, at Io16-17.
45 Id. at iOZO-z.
46 Press Release, Bus. Cycle Dating Comm., Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research (Sept. 20,
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the early 1990s gave way to the expansion known as the "dot-com" era.
During that period of higher-than-expected tax revenues, forty-three
states enacted permanent tax cuts.47 However, actual state government
spending rose during this time. For example, legislators in Oregon changed
the "kicker" law to provide for issuing refunds through a direct payment
instead issuing them through a tax credit, when tax revenues exceed the
forecasted amount by more than 2 percent.4" That contradiction - the
enactment of permanent tax cuts during temporary economic conditions -
eventually proved unsuslainable.
Near the end of 2001, the economy began to sour and the amount of
money feeding state revenues began to decline.49 Between 2001 and 2003,
Oregon was among the hardest hit states in the country.5" Oregon's Judicial
Department was cut by over $50 million, or approximately 12 percent.51
Oregon courts were forced to close on Fridays for the last four months of
the 2001-2003 biennium. Approximately 74 judicial branch employees
were laid off and another 189 judicial department jobs were left vacant.
52
Downturns in the economy profoundly affect the courts for several
reasons. To begin with, recessions have a two-fold effect on judicial
functions and funding. Recessions tend to simultaneously increase court
caseloads and decrease court funding. In other words, the gap between
eroding resources and increasing demand compounds over the duration
of a contraction. The recession of 2008, at times referred to as the Great
Recession, spanned 18 months and was the longest contraction since World
20o0), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2olo.html; Bus. Cycle Dating Comm., US
Business Cycle Expansion and Contractions, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES. (Sept. 2o, 2Oio), http://
www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html#announcements.
47 NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TIE STATE TAX CUTS OF
THE 1990S, TE CURRENT REVENUE CRISIS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE SERVICES (2002), avail-
able at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id= 1379.
48 OR. DEP'T OF REVENUE, OREGON PERSONAL INCOME TAX STATISTICS: CHARACTERISTICS
OF FILERS, app. A at 40 (20io), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DOR/STATS/
docs/lIoi_4O6_ioIOi-4o6.pdf (detailing the history of the two percent "kicker" refund).
49 Paul J. De Muniz, Chief Justice, Or. Supreme Court, 17th Justice William J. Brennan
Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice at New York University: Overturning Precedent:
the Case forJudicial Activism in Reengineering State Courts, at 0:24:35 (Oct. 27, 20o), avail-
able at http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/BRENNANLECTURE_2010.
5o Daniel J. Hall & Thomas Clarke, Delivering Judicial Services in Hard Times, NAT'L
CENTER FOR ST. CTS. (2OO8), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.orgcgi-bin/showfile.
exe?CISOROOT=/financial&CISOPTR=I 2 I.
51 Memorandum from Kateri Walsh, Or. State Bar Commc'n, to all Or. Presiding Judges
& Trial Court Adm'r (Oct. 22, 2002) (on file with the Oregon Judicial Department).
52 See Or. Judicial Dep't, Impact of Five Special Legislative Sessions 2001-03 Biennium
- General Funds Budget Only (on file with the Kentucky Law Journal) for a comparison of
the amount of salary reductions that were enacted in each of the Special Legislative Sessions
during the 2001-2003 biennium and a break-down of the amounts reduced from the several
specific categories of Oregon Judicial Department's operations.
20I1-2012]
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War I.3 Therefore, while the inadequate funding of courts is no novelty,*
the duration and consequent depth of the present crisis most certainly is.
Although the judicial branch has a responsibility to share the burden
of tough economic times, the structure and funding of courts also leaves
the judiciary particularly vulnerable to economic flux. The executive and
legislative branches are responsible for managing and apportioning state
funds. Because those branches often lack the resources to gain a thorough
understanding of how inadequate appropriations affect judicial operations,
they rely on the recommendations of state budgeting bureaucracies. The
net effect is that the judicial budget is treated, not as that of a co-equal
branch of government, but akin to that of a state agency, subject to the
same across-the-board agency cuts.
It is incorrect, however, to assume that such even-handed cuts will
exact equal effects. Most state judicial appropriations are less than three
percent of the state's general fund. In Oregon that number is approximately
2.3 percent.5 4 In California, the nation's largest state court system, only 2.8
percent of the general fund is reserved for the legislative, judicial, and
executive branches of government.55 Out of those amounts personnel costs
constitute, on average, approximately 85 percent of the judicial branch
budget. Any reduction of judicial expenses will be effected through firing
and pay cuts for judicial personnel. However, because many states have
constitutional protections for judges' compensation during their tenure in
office, these budget cuts, will have a disproportionate effect on the judicial
personnel other than the judges themselves.16 Furthermore, courts do not
53 Press Release, Bus. Cycle Dating Comm., supra note 46.
54 JOHN BORDEN & ROBIN LAMONTE, JOINT INTERIM COMM. ON STATE JUSTICE SYS.
REVENUES, OREGON JUDICIAL BRANCH BUDGET, REVENUE, AND CASELOAD HISTORY 4 (2010),
available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/commlIfo/justicerevenues/o63oi o/Judicial%2o
Branch% 2oHistory.pdf.
55 EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., STATE OF CAL., GOVERNOR'S BUDGET SUMMARY 2012-13,
2011-12 Reg. Sess., at 2o, available at http:lwww.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/
FullBudgetSummary.pdf. Even though the California budget groups the legislative, judicial,
and executive bran6hes together, the percentage is, nevertheless, more comparable to the
percentage within the Oregon budget than it would first appear. See BORDEN & LAMONTE,
supra note 54, at 4. The California Judicial Branch occupies a larger proportion than the other
branches within the group. The Judicial Branch category within the budget report includes
the entire state-level judiciary and the Administrative Office of the Courts. Id. at 8 I. By com-
parison, the Executive Branch category is limited to the direct staff of the Governor. It does
not include the state agencies that are under the direction of the executive branch. Id. at 83.
56 The constitutional protections for state court judges' salaries vary significantly be-
tween states. Although a complete comparison of the state constitutional protections for ju-
dicial salaries is beyond the scope of this article, these provisions can, generally be divided
into three groups: those specifically protecting judges' salaries; those protecting all public
officials' salaries; and those providing no guarantee for judicial salaries. A significant number
of state constitutions contain guarantees similar to the United States Constitution's guarantee
for federal judges, which provides that judicial compensation "shall not be diminished dur-
ing [the judge's] Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § I; see, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. 1II,
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have large capital expenditures that can be set aside to survive periodic
budget shortfalls. Ironically, while budget cuts are large enough to have
instant, drastic effects on personnel and the court services that they
provide, the amounts saved are too small to relieve the state deficit in any
meaningful way. In fact, as shown in the studies set out below, reductions
in court funding negatively affect state deficits and overall state economies.
Unfortunately, that manner of funding also strains relations between
branches where the judiciary is at the mercy of the executive and the
legislature for its budgetary needs.
Nevertheless, the judiciary deserves priority funding, not only because
it is a co-equal branch of government, but because courts stand at the
intersection of every important social, political, and legal issue the states
face. Ninety-five percent of all litigation in the United States is initiated
in state courts.5 7 In 2007, 18 million civil cases and 21 million criminal
cases were filed in state courts, compared to 280,000 civil cases and 66,000
criminal cases filed in federal courts in that same period."8 Despite that,
legislators seem to de-prioritize judicial budgets. At the end of the 2011
legislative session, one Oregon senator voiced his frustration over the
eleventh-hour consideration given the judicial budget, stating that "[o]nce
again, here we are at the end of the session and we have the judicial branch
budget before us .... And we have to make tough choices because it wasn't
prioritized and dealt with earlier." s9
§ 4 ("[The Legislature] shall not reduce the salary of a judge during a term of office ..
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25(a); OR. CONST.
art. VII, § I; PA. CONST. art. V, § I6(a). Additionally, some state constitutions provide general
compensation guarantees for all, or a set of public officials, which include state court judges.
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 17 ("[N]or shall the compensation of any public officer..
.be increased or diminished during his term of office...."); ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § I I (listing
specific public officials, including state court judges, whose salaries during their term of office
are protected); NEB. CONST. art. III, § i9; Ky. CONST. § 235; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5I(B)(5).
However, there are some state constitutions that do not contain compensation guarantees for
judges. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 35 (merely providing that "they should have honorable
salaries, ascertained and established by standing law," but containing no guarantee during the
judge's tenure in office).
57 R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2oo8 STATE COURT CASELOADS, at iv (2oo), available at http://www.
courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2oo8-Online.ashx.
58 Laurence H. Tribe, Senior Counselor for Access to Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference
of State Court Administrators (July 26, 2oio), in NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., FUTURE TRENDS
IN ST. CT. 2011, at 1, 2, available at http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-
trends/-/media/Files/PDF/Information%zoand%zoResources/TRENDS_bookzoI i.ashx.
59 Matt Cecil, Legislature Approves Budget for State Courts, OR. CA'. NEWS, June 29, 2011,
http://oregoncapitolnews.com/blog/2o I I/o6/29/legislature-approves-budget-for-state-
courts/ (quoting Oregon Senator Doug Whitsett).
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IV AT THE CROSSROADS OF CITIZENS AND COURTS
Variations in funding levels, funding sources, and the incongruity in
the consideration of judicial appropriations have left courts in many states
hard-pressed to adequately perform their constitutionally required duties.
The state court systems of California, Florida, and Oregon exemplify that
concern.
In 2011, the California legislature cut $350 million from the judicial
branch and $310 million from the court construction fund,60 resulting
in a cumulative deficit of $20.4 million to the San Francisco Superior
Court. The San Francisco Superior Court Executive Officer, T Michael
Yuen, announced dire outcomes.61  He projected that twenty-five
courtrooms would be closed indefinitely in October, and under the ensuing
reorganization only three of the seventeen civil trial departments would
remain open. In September, 200 layoff notices would become effective,
leaving the court with 280 employees out of what was 591 three years prior.
The natural affects to the general public are substantial. Paying a traffic
ticket was projected to take hours waiting in line, obtaining records would
take months, it would be years before a case sees the inside of a courtroom,
and getting a divorce would take eighteen months.
6
In Florida, a state with severe foreclosures, the judicial appropriation
comes predominantly from the fees for those foreclosures. Nevertheless,
the volatility of foreclosure filings led the court system to run a deficit in
the last quarter of the 2010/2011 fiscal year. As a result, Florida Supreme
Court Chief Justice Charles Canady sought and received a $33 million
dollar loan in emergency funding from the governor to cover expenses. At
the beginning of the 2011/2012 fiscal year the court system already faces
substantial deficits and will have to borrow $54 million more just to get it
through the first quarter; further loans will likely be necessary.
63
6o Press Release, Cal. Courts, Judicial Branch Budget Cuts: California Wrestles with
Cuts to the Judicial Branch (July 26, 2011), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/14876.htm.
61 Press Release, T Michael Yuen, Court Exec. Officer of S.E Superior Court, The San
Francisco Superior Court Notifies the AOC of Reduced Clerks' Office Hours, Closure of 25
Courtrooms Effective October 3, 2011 (Aug. 3, 201 i), available at http://www.sfsuperiorcourt.
org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=2895.
62 The Judicial System, the Feeblest Branch: An Underfunded Court System Weakens the Economy
as well as Access to Justice, ECONOMiST, Oct. 1, 2o I, http:lwww.economist.com/node/2 1530985
[hereinafter The Judicial System, the Feeblest Branch].
63 The Official Newsletter of the State Courts System of Florida, FULL CT. PRESS (Office of
the State Court Adm'r, Tallahassee, Fla.), Summer 2011, at 3, available at http://www.flcourts.
orglgen-public/pubs/bin/fcpsummerI i.pdf. Florida's courts were funded primarily by the
general budget at the start of the 2008 recession. Id. at 4. As foreclosures increased due to the
housing market collapse that funding source began to dwindle, leading to a twelve percent
reduction in court system's budget and the elimination of 290.5 positions between 2007 and
2009. Id. In order to find an alternate funding source, in 2oo9 Florida lawmakers created the
State Courts Revenue Trust Fund, subsidized primarily by mortgage filing fees. Id.
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In Oregon, courts saw a budget reduction of approximately 16 percent
during the 2011 fiscal year from the previous biennium's already reduced
budget. During the 2011 legislative session, the judicial branch requested
$403.6 million dollars just to maintain services at previous year levels. Yet,
the legislature returned an approved budget of $385 million,'M leaving
Oregon's judicial branch approximately $19 million short of what it
requires.
As funding is stripped away, court systems resort to institutionalized
reactions, normalized over decades of chronic shortfalls:
* Layoffs
* Hiring freezes
• Furloughs and changes in work hours
* Defer pay raises and cost-of-living increases
* Delay filling judicial positions
" Reduce court services by hours, days, or not
hearing certain types of cases
" Freeze spending in non-personnel areas
(typically training, travel, and equipment
purchase)
" Defer payment on goods and services to later
fiscal years
" Limit or cancel civil hearings in deference to
criminal and family issues
6
Unfortunately, such methods are mere stop-gap measures designed to
weather a storm rather than deal with the problem long term.
In the interim, the long-term nature of the current funding crisis is
creating dual systems of "justice." As the backlog of cases grows, so does the
cost - in dollars and time - that it takes to bring a civil case to trial. In New
Hampshire, for example, civil plaintiffs brought suit against the state and
its treasurer to restore adequate permanent funding to the judiciary. The
plaintiffs were allegedly damaged by trial delays brought on by budget-
mandated court closures, furloughs, and reductions in judicial hours.' For
some plaintiffs, the cost of waiting eventually will outstrip the potential
64 STATE OF OR. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE 2011-13 LEGISLATIVELY
ADOPTED BUDGET 387 (201 1), available at http://www.leg.state.or.uS/comm/Ifo/20 1-13%20
LAB.pdf.
65 The Judicial System, the Feeblest Branch, supra note 62; WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF DELAYS IN CIVIL TRIALS IN FLORIDA'S COURTS DUE TO UNDER-FUNDING OF COURT
SYSTEM 4-5 (2009) [hereinafter WASH. EcoN. GRP., FLA.], available at http://www.ncsconline.
org/DComm/News/Fla.study.o I6o9.pdf.
66 See Lynne Tuohy, NH Residents Sue State over Court Budget Cuts, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 28,
20o, http://www.boston.com/news/local/new-hampshire/articles/2010/0 9 /28/nh-residents-
suestate over court-budget-cuts/.
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benefit of a favorable verdict. When that happens, a litigant's financial state
often will inform the litigant's options.
When litigants with sufficient money and resources are denied justice
in the public courtrooms they can seek resolution in other forums, such as
mediation and arbitration. Although such alternative methods of dispute
resolution benefit efficiency and economy, they also "operate[e] outside
the watchful gaze of the public and beyond the effective reach of the rule
of law."
67
In contrast, "[flor those litigants who cannot afford . . . private
alternative[s], the natural response to a denial of public justice is more
troublesome still. They must either suffer in alienated silence or take the
law into their own hands. '68 The co-existence of these parallel, private
legal systems reinforces the notion that justice is only for those who can
afford it, and that the law applies differently to those who have the means.
Commercial interests face a different crossroads. Court delays can
benefit large companies that would rather sit on a case instead of having
to pay an insurance claim, for instance. In contrast, court delays can hold
smaller companies hostage, powerless to invest or expand while their assets
are tied up in litigation. Both of those effects contribute to the millions
of dollars in direct state costs through job losses, uncollected taxes, and
industrial out-put. Unfortunately, according to the multiplier effect, when
indirect economic effects are accounted for, the same state losses can
become billions.
69
A 2011 study concluded that court delays decrease a State's ability to
improve communities and to attract and expand industries, which represent
a deadweight cost to the State economy.70 In Georgia, for instance, the total
adverse impact on economic output ranged between $337 million and $802
million annually and could lead to a loss of jobs between 3,457 and 7,098
67 Tribe, supra note 58, at 3.
68 Id.
69 Carol A. Dinkins et al., Crisis in the Courts: Defining the Problem, 302 A.B.A. REP. HOUSE
DELEGATES 1, 5 (2O I) [hereinafter A.B.A. REPORT 302], available at http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/justicecenter/taskforceon-the-preservation of thejustice-system.html (fol-
low "Approved: HOD Resolution 302" hyperlink) ("The immediate loss of almost $i.I billion
from the combined salaries of the laid-off court workers and the multiplier effect those direct
losses would have on other workers in the local economy." (emphasis added)). See generally
Roy WEINSTEIN & STEVAN PORTER, ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA .OF FUNDING CUTBACKS AFFECTING THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
(2009), available at http://www.micronomics.com/articles/LA_Courts-EconomicsImpact.pdf
(analyzing the compounding impact on the general economy because of cutbacks resulting in
an underfunded judiciary).
70 WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE GEORGIA ECONOMY OF DELAYS IN
GEORGIA7S STATE COURTS DUE TO RECENT REDUCTIONS IN FUNDING FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
I (201i) [hereinafter WASH. ECON. GRP., GA.], available at http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/
news/201 I 1%2oGeorgia%2oBar%zoEconomic%2olmpacts.pdf.
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throughout the state.7 Unfortunately, the multiplier effect and deadweight
costs remain unaccounted for by legislatures and the general public.
The judiciary's ability to meet constitutional mandates surely will be
crippled if funding continues to be stripped away as a means to balance
the state budgets. Moreover, the fragile public perception - that the legal
system is only for those who have the coffers to afford it and the time to
wait years, or at times decades, for justice to take its full course - will be
confirmed. Indeed, our pledge of allegiance, instead of teaching children
that in our nation they are free citizens who have the right to expect justice
for all, will read more like a hollow punch-line at the end of a joke.
As some politicians have identified, inadequate court funding is "one
of the reasons for the public's loss of respect for the judicial system."72
What they have failed to add, however, is that regardless of the presence
or absence of a crisis, lack of public respect is a deadweight cost that the
judiciary, democracy, and justice, can least afford.
V. NOT WHERE DOES THE JUDICIARY Go, BUT How:
THE LIMITS OF STOPGAP THINKING
Prominent indicators refer to the present economic climate as the "new
normal."7 3 Consequently, to establish resilient court systems that are able
to thrive in this climate, the judiciary must first discard any assumption
that normalcy will return in any predictable, typical sense. Economists
have cautioned that the recovery now underway will be slower and more
modest than past rebounds.74 In Oregon, general fund deficits in the range
of 20 percent are expected to persist through 2019.15 Historically, the worst
budget crunch for states comes in the year or two after a recession ends.76
As a result, according to the Pew Center on the States,
Once states get past the immediate crisis of plugging record-high
budget gaps, they will confront the likelihood that the recession will
impose permanent changes in the size of government and in how states
71 Id. at I.
72 PAULA A. MONOPOLI, AMERICAN PROBATE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, IMPROVING THE
PROCESS 95 (2003).
73 See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF THE STATES 2010: How THE RECESSION MIGHT
CHANGE STATES 2 (2oIo), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
Stateof theStates_20o.pdf?n=5899.
74 BRUCE GOLDBERG, OR. GOVERNOR'S RESET CABINET, BEST STEPS FORWARD: A BUDGET
BALANCING PATH TO RESET STATE GOVERNMENT & OVERCOME A DECADE OF DEFICITS 8 (2010),
available at http-//archivedwebsites.sos.state.or.us/GovernorKulongoski2ol I/governor.or-
egon.gov/Gov/docs/reset2_report~web.pdf.
75 Id. at 6.
76 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 73, at 2.
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deliver services, who pays for them, and which ones take priority in an
era of competing interests."
In practical terms, that means the downsizing and streamlining, cost-
shaving and cross-training that were once stopgap measures used to clear
cyclical economic hurdles are now business as usual. It also means that a
rebounding economy can no longer be relied on to forgive the unintended
consequences of those hemorrhage-stemming, decisions. All the while, the
tertiary needs of courts cannot be put on hold while the judiciary searches
for a permanent end to the funding rollercoaster. Although stopgap
measures remain indispensable, stopgap thinking must be severed.
Stopgap thinking is behaving as if the symptoms of a problem are the
problem. Settling for stamping out the same fires over and over by using
the same fallback fixes, such as furloughs and closures, is stopgap thinking.
Certainly, fires must be put out and mid-biennium cuts must be faced down
but merely meeting the demands of each crisis as it arises is a thankless and
losing proposition. Every successful belt-tightening simply precipitates
another legislative cut. Stopgap thinking is an incremental ratcheting
down of funding, expectations, morale, and services. And, as the wave of
court closures across the country confirms,78 such redundant squandering
of resources is unsustainable. Yet, if future generations of courts are to be
spared the same plight, the ongoing triage cannot be allowed to suspend
the pursuit of primary long-term considerations and strategies.
The seriousness of the situation at hand and the history that precedes
it demand meaningful change that involves a grander, more profound,
and lasting shift. It is true that the judicial funding crisis is complex. The
moving parts are countless. Since the reengineering of court structure,
processes, and protocols will remain central, a grander, more profound
shift will be one that pervades those tangibles. It will set the essence of
judicial existence and public sentiment. That shift will be the conscious
shaping, assumption, and assertion of an appropriate institutional identity:
an identity that will merit and generate broad and durable public "buy-in."
Buy-in of that nature, however, will not come by way of ease or hubris.
Efforts must be earnest, sustained, and able to weather the wheel-spinning
that invariably precedes traction. In this case that "traction" will be the key
to judicial sustenance that pure stopgap thinking can never accomplish.
77 Id. at i.
78 See generally Economic Impact on the Courts, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.
ncsc.org/Information-and-Resources/Budget-Resource-Center/Economic-impact.aspx (last
visited Mar. 26, 2012) (compiling press, reports, and relevant links regarding economic impact
on courts).
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VI. THE SWAP MEET OF CURES
As previously stated, judicial defunding is a hot topic. Rare is a day
without a fresh headline espousing the fallout courts suffer79 as budgets
are repeatedly cut and courts flail to stem the hemorrhage. A quick online
search reveals the growing abundance of ways courts can reengineer,
reorganize, and strategize to weather the fallout of a still plummeting
economy.'0
A 2011 Task Force for the Preservation of the Justice System report
resulted in adoption of ABA Resolution 302 which resolves to (1) urge bar
associations to document and publicize the effects of funding cutbacks; (2)
urge state governments to fulfill their constitutional responsibility to grant
the judiciary stable and predictable funding; (3) urge courts to employ best
practices, efficient use of resources, and financial accountability; and (4)
urge courts and bar associations to use advisory groups, civic education,
and direct engagement with public officials to communicate the value of
an adequately funded judiciary.8" The National Center for State Courts
issued the 2010 Future Trends Report: a comprehensive compilation of
articles that offer thorough analysis of trends across vast aspects of judicial
reengineering.
8s
Many, perhaps most states already have developed and published their
own such lists or have announced relevant objectives in their annual state
of the judiciary report.8 3 The Oregon Judicial Department 2009-2013
Strategic Plan refines Oregon's goals into key performance areas that
detail and prioritize separate action items. The plan identifies two items
as essential because they span all other aims: implementation of Oregon
eCourt (electronic court) and addressing the court facilities crisis. The
balance of the plan sets out twenty-one strategically critical action items,
and seventeen items to be addressed as time and resources permit.
8 4
79 Id.; see also Task Force in the News, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/jus-
ticescenter/task force on the-preservation-of the-justicesystem/inthenews.html (last
visited Dec. 27, 201i) (providing updated links to articles on state court underfunding).
8o State Activities Map, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-
Resources/Budget-Resource-Center/States-activities-map.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
81 Resolution, 302 A.B.A. RESOL. HOUSE DELEGATES I (Aug. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Resolution
3021, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/justice-center/task-force-on-the-pres-
ervation of the_.justice-system.html (follow "Approved: House of Delegates Resolution
302" hyperlink).
82 Trends in State Courts 2010: Special Feature on International Courts, NAT'L CENTER
FOR ST. CTS., http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/
ctadmin&CISOPTR= i6o5 (last visited Apr. 8,2012).
83 State of the Judiciary Quotes Related to Budgetary Issues, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST.
CTS., http://www.ncsc.orgInformation-and-Resources/Budget-Resource-Center/State-of-
the-Judiciary-Quotes-Related-to-Budgetary-Issues.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
84 OR. JUDICIAL DEP'T, 2009-2013 STRATEGIC PLAN 25-26 (n.d.), available at http://courts.
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Among the myriad of reports, two things stand out. First, the crisis
in each state involves a unique confluence of factors that no pat, single
combination of measures will solve. Instead, states must craft their own
recipe from the growing buffet of ideas. Ultimately, in the novel political
economy that states now exist, trial and error will determine the efficacy
even of evidence-based actions. Second, there is one objective that
all plans have in common: outreach. Plans characterize this common
objective differently: as communication to improve information sharing
with the legislature and to promote public confidence, understanding, and
collaboration;85 to recruit stakeholder-advocates by explaining the value
of an adequately funded judiciary;86 and, to instruct on the dynamics of
civic87 or governmental partnerships. In addition, most, if not all, states and
organizations call directly on judges to personally lead the charge.
The trend toward outreach is timely. Every budgetary allocation
runs through the legislature and effective efforts to influence legislative
decision-makers requires broader community involvement from outside
the legal profession.88 That is particularly true because courts are
pursuing many strategies that will require budget approval, legislation,
or constitutional amendments: for example, to assign the judiciary a set
portion of the budget; to prohibit recapture of allocated funds; to manage
surplus through a judicial stabilization fund; to enact a hands-off rule for
submitted budgets; or a rule that bypasses the executive and ushers the
judicial budget directly to the legislature. In Oregon, for instance, soon
voters will have the opportunity to amend the state constitution to refer
to the judiciary as a "branch" of government instead of a "department,"
as the constitution does now.89 That may be only a two-syllable shift, but
harmonizing the state constitution with the federal constitution, on that
point, can help avoid confusion and contention during future "co-equal
branch," and "separation of powers" conversations.
VII. PUBLIC RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY
Judicial aspirations, like those described above, carry significant
implications and will require significant public support. That being the
case, it is odd that the communication-based plans mentioned earlier either
stop short or shy away from calling the suggested "outreach" what it is - or
perhaps, more accurately, what it needs to be - public relations. Outreach
oregon.gov/OJD/docs/OSCA/OJDStrategicPlano3zoo9.pdf.
85 Id. at 17.
86 A.B.A. REPORT 302, supra note 69, at 15-18.
87 Trends in State Courts 2010, supra note 82, at i.
88 A.B.A. REPORT 302, supra note 68, at 15.
89 H.R.J. Res.44,201 IOr. Laws (201 i), availableathttp://w.leg.state.or.us/Itorlaws/
sessresmem.dir/hjroo44.pdf.
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is insufficient. Even public awareness is shortsighted. Public relations, on
the other hand, are more plausible way to achieve the quantum of buy-in
necessary to soothe present and future crisis. Why that is yet to happen is
worth examination.
Historically, the job description of a justice or judge has not included
the title of "PR" director. Undoubtedly, some judicial careers have been
chosen based on the appeal of that relative obscurity. That, however, is no
longer the case, nor an option. For better or worse, the judiciary is being
forced out from behind its pillars and robes and into the public relations
business. And, quite frankly, who better to do it?
Initially, a public relations campaign may conjure up an endeavor too
political for an impartial judiciary to undertake. That view holds merit to
the extent it is derived from concerns regarding efforts to "forge ... overt
alliance[s] between the judiciary and the business community."9 In both
Oregon 91 and South Carolina,92 the Chief Justices, at different times, forged
such overt alliances with the business community in an effort to lobby
the legislature for judicial appropriations. As it turns out, both Justices did
so successfully. But in the context of business related cases, where these
overt alliances may subject the judiciary to public questioning of decisional
independence, the courts should be careful not to create an appearance
of favoritism, because as David J. Barron argues, "the concern about
appearances is not trivial." 93 The "public" in public relations, however,
will help to dispel those concerns. The breadth and regularity of effective
"public" relations. will dilute the attention given to individual business
interests and, by doing so, will disperse appearances of impropriety.
Moreover, in soliciting businesses to support judicial funding, it is not
favorable courts, but open courts and timely dockets that are indispensable.
When courts are accessible, the multiplier effect and subsequent
deadweight costs are avoided.9 4 Those costs refer to the compounding toll
that underfunded courts cost state coffers through job losses, uncollected
taxes, and industrial output.9 Eventually, when the accrued burden
of those tolls deprives a state of its ability to improve communities and
expand industries, businesses and individuals both suffer. But states will
90 David J. Barron, Judicial Independence and the State Court Funding Crisis, ioo Ky. L.J.
755, 761 (2012).
91 A Message from the Chief Justice & the State Court Adm'r, in JUDICIAL DEP'T OF
THE STATE OF OR., OREGON COURTS TODAY AND TOMORROW: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OREGON
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT OUR STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR 2008 AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF 2007
(2oo8), available at http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/docs/OSCA/2007-OJDAnnual-Report.pdf.
92 Cindi Ross Scoppe, Op-Ed., How the Legislature Compromises Courts, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 10, 2011, at 6.
93 Barron, supra note 9o, at 781.
94 See WASH. ECON. GRP., GA.,supra note 70, at 1, 13.
95 Id. at 13-1 7 .
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not suffer in isolation. Without a rule of law "'where a business can be sure
that [its] ... property will be protected and citizens will be free to speak
their minds ... nations will never fully realize their potential."'"
Vice President Joe Biden recently commented that American "citizens
are willing and able - and encouraged - to challenge authority and think
differently, bringing about the innovations that enhance the nation's
'capacity to grow, compete and win."'97 According to Vice President Biden,
in this country, those innovations are protected by the rule of law, and
"[judges] are the glue that holds this all together." 98
Judges may always have been the legal-glue, paving the way for
innovators. Now, however, judges also must be innovators in their own
right. Fittingly, public relations can be credited to this judicial innovation
and chalked up to role reengineering. Public relations do not automatically
implicate "the inherent and ethical limitations on judges' involvement in
the political process .... "99 Think of "PR" as a new judicial competency, to
be incorporated no differently than hearing arguments or writing opinions.
The truth is, the judiciary exists in a complex society at a time when every
entity faces a common choice - evolve or become irrelevant. Moreover,
whether the judiciary's public relations campaign ultimately turns out to be
pedagogical or political will be determined by the convictions, grace, and
dignity of those who undertake it.
The more complicated aspect of this notion is that public relations
campaigns generally revolve around an identifiable product, something
that the public can envisage; be it an entity, image, presence, persona,
or concept. Currently, however, the judiciary has an identity problem on
three levels: first, it lacks public familiarity outside of intellectual circles or
beyond the citizens with occasion to use the courts; second, it gets kicked
under the umbrella of "government," by default; and third, the nagging
stereotype remains of robed intellectuals, invulnerably passing judgment
from their marble-pillared fortress. However, identity, for the purposes of
this discussion, stretches far beyond recognizing a court building from a
passing car. This is about the institutional identity of the judiciary and its
presence, or lack thereof, in the everyday lives of Americans.
A recent newspaper article illustrated the "government" effect and
the judiciary's quasi-invisibility. The title captured the subject matter:
Recession doesn'tslow travel on the public's dime by Oregon government officials."°°
96 Sean O'Sullivan, VP Biden: Court System has Vital Role in Liberty, NEws J.
(Wilmington, Del.), Jan. 31, 2012, http:llwww.delawareonline.com/article/BL/2012013i/
NEWSo2/z01 3 I03 32NP-Biden-Court-system-has-vital-role-liberty (emphasis added).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 A.B.A. REPORT 302, supra note 69, at 15.
oo Harry Esteve, Recession Doesn't Slow Travel On the Public's Dime
by Oregon Government Officials, ThE OREGONIAN, Dec. 17, 2011, http:ll
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The article aimed to disparage certain government agencies for their
alleged spending habits in contrast to belt-tightening by families and small
businesses. Midway through his commentary on poor agency behavior, the
author championed the judicial department for having cut travel spending
by nearly 35 percent, almost $400,000; for suspending or disbanding
statewide advisory and policy committees; and for sharply cutting training
for judges and eliminating training for staff.'
What is worth sharing about that article is not its subject matter but
the 159 comments on the article that followed. Notwithstanding the self-
selection bias of commenters, the comments displayed an alarming lack of
distinction between the agencies and the arms of government that were
mentioned in the article. Scornful generalizations ran rampant. For example,
as one person commented: "State government has made their choices, US
versus THEM. It's government spenders against government payers" -
grossly commingling every organ of the state within the criticism.'02 Vague
references to "government," were made - without specificity - no less than
96 times.0 3 The number of comments that mentioned the judiciary - zero.
Self-selection bias, in this instance, is highly relevant and is not
dispositive of this discussion. In fact, quite the opposite is true. It stands
to reason that those who felt compelled to weigh in on that issue and in
that manner may be apt to react similarly when other issues implicate
"government," at the ballot box, for instance. A recent newsletter found
similar reader responses to articles on judicial funding cuts in California
"disheartening but instructive."" The author noted an important truth: the
comments "reflect people's attitudes, which in a budget fight we dismiss
at our peril."'' 5 Pushing that one step further, continued failure to engage
public attitudes will always be at the peril of the judiciary, regardless of the
crisis of the day.
In Oregon, about one in five citizens use the courts in a given year.
That means that validating public attitudes will include reaching the 80
percent of residents who have no direct contact with the courts and whose
sympathy will be less susceptible to tales of judicial woe and cuts in service.
Any confidence lost, or absent, among that non-court-using majority is
www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/zo i/1 2/recession_doesnt_
slowtravelb.html.
ioI Id.
102 Ltjd, posted comment, (Dec. 17, 2011, 9:27 AM), in Harry Esteve, Recession
Doesn't Slow Travel On the Public's Dime by Oregon Government Officials, THE OREGONIAN,
Dec. 17, 2oi, http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2oiI/I 2/recession-doesnt_
slowtravelb.html.
103 Id.
104 Alex Aikman, Why Not... Supplement the Thoughts in the July Issue of TOL about Budgets?,
in THINKING OuT LOUD, AN OCCASIONAL LETrER FROM ALEX AIKMAN, Oct. 2011, at 2 (on file
with author).
IO5 Id.
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just as likely a consequence of the "government" effect, especially while
legislative approval is at an all-time low.1"6 A recent poll noted that a
"broader distrust of government in general" may be responsible for a 15
percent drop in public approval of the Supreme Court in 2010.107 That
being said, the judiciary need not disparage its co-equal branches in order
to distinguish itself, but it must distinguish itself, nonetheless. To do so,
it must devise an identity and presence. Until it does that, it will be in no
position to expect allegiance from the public. The generalized grievances
lobbed at "government" will continue to implicate the judiciary by default.
A meaningful presence will be the outgrowth of a return to basics. It
is up to judicial leaders to humble themselves to undertake a searching
reassessment of what the judidiary is, what it means to be a judicial steward,
and what representation should come to mind when citizens think of the
judiciary. But that is not all. A lasting, institution-worthy presence will arise
through the diligent screening of activities, processes, thoughts and conduct.
The relevant inquiry is whether every action, inaction, and interaction on
behalf of the judiciary, stands to promote institutional dignity, intra- and
inter- branch respect, and public rapport. The quality and scope of the
judiciary's eventual institutional presence will depend on the running sum
of the responses that surface.
VIII. THE Do's AND DON'TS OF JUDICIAL SELF-DEFINITION
It will be up to judicial leaders to actively craft and defend the
institutional character and presence of the judiciary. If they do not, outside
comments and circumstances will. And until the judiciary finds a firm place
on the public radar it will remain an easy target. Moreover, a frustrated
public is particularly susceptible to disparaging suggestions about an
institution, never mind a government institution, especially where they
do not sense a presence to defend. Lest we forget, public perceptions are
infinitely more difficult to dislodge than they are to inspire.
Something courts cannot afford to do is to sell one another down
the river. Reports of questionable judicial conduct, have and will, color
generalizations about the judiciary. A 2003 poll posed that the Executive
and the Legislature were two branches of government and then asked
respondents to name the third. Disappointingly, 43 percent of respondents
did not know or answered incorrectly. °8 Certainly, a population that cannot
io6 Jeffrey M. Jones, Congressional Job Approval Ties Historic Low of 13%: Disapproval
Rating of 84% Highest in Gallup Annals, GALLUP (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/149009/Congressional-Job-Approval-Ties-Historic-Low.aspx.
107 Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Approval Rating Drops, Nearing 2005 Low Point,
A.B.A. J. (Oct. 4, 2011, 1o:1 2 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme-court_
approval-rating-drops-nearing._oo5_low-point/.
io8 George H. Gallup, Jr., How Many Americans Know U.S. History? Part I, GALLUP (Oct.
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name or distinguish between governmental branches cannot be assumed
to distinguish between courts by geography or jurisdiction. For that reason,
a black-eye on one court is a black-eye on all courts.
In the past year, incidents ofjudicial tension sparked attention-grabbing
headlines that raised questions about judicial integrity. Justice' feud gets
physical, 1 0 9 and Wisconsin Justice Says Court Fight Led to Choking,'10 appeared
after a Supreme Court justice's hands found their way around another
justice's neck during an argument in chambers. The truth of whether it was
an act of self-defense, or more of a chokehold, or whether she had come at
him with fists raised, is immaterial; the appearance is damning, regardless.
To the chagrin of judges everywhere, the incident made national headlines.
Yet even when headlines remain sensible, disparaging remarks
between government branches bode well for neither side in the eyes of
the public. For example, in Massachusetts, communication between the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Governor's office broke down when
the judicial budget was reduced $24.2 million below the previous year.
Though related, the merits of the issue are not the focus here. What is
noteworthy is the constitutional mugging to the media by the Governor's
counsel in characterizing the situation as the court's "attempt to constrain
the Governor's constitutional authority," where the "courts cannot manage
their fiscal affairs."'' Relevant judicial concerns were sloughed off as no
more than "'posturing' by a branch with sagging morale among its workers,"
and judicial motives were questioned as "jockeying.""' "We look forward
to their explanation," the spokesperson continued, "[i]n the meantime,
the Governor will continue to exercise the powers granted to him by the
Constitution of this Commonwealth." 1I3
Although four years of budget cuts had left Massachusetts courts $95
million shy of peak funding, one executive branch spokesperson declared
the court could cut "waste" and "fat" before resorting to the "overkill" of
the sought after moratorium on judicial appointments." 4 Another of the
executive's councilors recognized "the brewing fight as a reflection of
the dire fiscal situation of the courts," yet added that the executive and
21, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/9526/How-Many-Americans-Know-US-History-Part.
aspx.
I9 Crocker Stephenson et al., Justices' Feud Gets Physical: Prosser, Bradley Clashed on Eve
of Union Ruling, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 26, 201 , at Ai, available at http://www.jsonline.
com/news/statepolitics/I 24546o64.html.
i o Wisconsin Justice Says Court Fight Led to Choking, FOXNEws.coM (June 26, 2o I),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2o i/o6/26/wisconsin-justice-says-court-fight-led-to-choking.
IIi Michael Norton & Kyle Cheney, Patrick Rejects Court Request to Halt JudicialNominees,
DEDHAM TRANSCRIPT (July 13, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://www.dailynewstranscript.com/news/
x4o l791 522/Patrick-rejects-court-request-to-halt-judicial-nominees##axzz InziPGN83.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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the judiciary "understand that this is how the interplay of two branches
of government try and sort out ... responsibilities."'1 5 Unfortunately, that
conclusion wholly overlooks the most important party - the citizens.
In that instance, the message to citizens smacked more of partisan
bickering than of professional, inter-branch communication. Moreover, it
does a public disservice when a message paints the acts of the judiciary as a
deliberate affront to the constitutional powers of the Governor yet neglects
to explain that the judiciary, also, has constitutional responsibilities. The
unfortunate result is that any merit, underlying the truth or falsity of the
accusations or the fact that the court refrained from firing back in the press,
is skewed or lost. The general public is neither prepared nor inclined to
sort out the substance or even the judicial role in such situations. Thus,
although poor examples may be few in a relative sense, the institution will
be judged by its worst elements, whether real or perceived. Jurisdictional
boundaries will never confine bad impressions.
That consequence is further amplified because such incidents are
taking place on a national stage during a frigid political climate. In 2011,
more attempts were lodged to impeach state judges for their decisions,
than in recent history and perhaps ever.' 6 "In all but two instances...
the sole accusation was that the judge(s) in question issued opinions that
displeased members of the legislature.""' 7 Anti-judicial sentiment in New
Hampshire prompted an attempt to impeach the entire Superior Court,"'
and during its 2012 session, New Hampshire's legislature will entertain a
proposed constitutional amendment to allow the legislature to determine
the constitutionality of legislative acts. 119
IX. THE IMPORTANCE OF FRAMING AND SINCERITY
Every chance to appear on behalf of the judiciary or to speak on court
issues is an additional opportunity to distinguish and enhance judicial
identity and presence. Accordingly, the ongoing inquiry is still whether
what is said and done stands to promote institutional dignity, intra- and
inter-branch respect, and public rapport. The calculation is not strict math.
115 Id. (alterations in original).
116 Bill Raftery, 20Ii Year in Review: Record Number of Impeachment Attempts Against Judges
for their Decisions, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Dec. 27, ZOti), http:/lgaveltogavel.ustsite/zo I 11 /2712011-
year-in-review-record-number-of-impeachment-attempts-against-judges-for-their-deci-
sions/.
117 Id.
i18 Id.
i i9 Const. Amend. Con. Res. 28, 162d Sess. Gen. Ct. (N.H. zo12) (providing that the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire shall determine the constitutionality of judicial acts and
the legislature shall determine the constitutionality of legislative acts).
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However, neither is there a need to plumb the depths of psychological
science to appreciate how impressions are formed.
How issues are framed and analyzed is an important inquiry. That is
especially true because many presentations, symposiums, and workshops
are archived in audio or video format that later can be used for outreach,
teaching, or personal knowledge. Participants in forums are no longer just
brainstorming solutions, they are creating valuable tools, which can be
helpful in formulating institutional identity.
Consequently, even when participating on a panel in the comfortable
presence of peers, how a thought is couched will affect the usefulness
of a discussion, both contemporaneously and as recorded. For instance,
to off-handedly coin the judicial funding crisis in combative or winner-
take-all terms, limits the use of that discussion. The rubric is, does each
representation distinguish the judiciary from the "government" that
provoked the ire of the commenters mentioned above, or does it play into
the stereotypical partisan bickering from which the judiciary must distance
itself? Even in jest, to risk such interpretation is too costly.
When a state's chief justice trumpets that, "[f]or the first time, we have
a completely Republican Supreme Court and I am honored to be able to
serve [on it],"' 0 it is likely that many of his contemporaries shudder outright.
Yet, it is similarly ill advised to casually urge that outreach is a matter of
marching out the Chief Justice after inviting stakeholders to convene at the
courthouse,"2 ' or holding legislative hearings to trot in some sob stories.1
2 2
Such dicta gives the impression that invitees should be flattered, to be
included and it cheapens potential efforts between branches. Again, even
when an attitude is merely careless or subconscious, anything that may be
perceived as stereotypical government arrogance ratchets the stature of the
judiciary down to the level of its detractors.
It is not even safe to resignedly comment that "the judiciary isn't a
particularly powerful advocacy group,"'2 3 because of the tendency to
foreclose hope that the judiciary might become a powerful advocacy group.
And what purpose is served by commenting that it is "difficult for members
120 Patrick Johnston, Why Brag About a Partisan Court?, EUFAULA ThIB., Jan. 27, 2012,
http://www2.eufaulatribune.com/news/20 12/jan/27/why-brag-about-partisan-court-ar-
3123316/.
121 Panel Discussion on Justice Underfunding Features: Justice O'Connor Theodore B. Olson,
and David Boies, ABANOW.ORG (Aug. 22, 201i), http://www.abanow.org/2o1 i/o8/justice-un-
derfundin-panel-features-justice-oconnor-theodore-b-olson-and-david-boies/
122 Id.
123 James Podgers, In Defense of the Courts: Symposium Finds No Easy Way to Fund Courts,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 2o1i, at 56 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Opening Remarks at University of
Kentucky Symposium on State Court Funding (Sept. 23, 201 I)), available at http://www.aba-
journal.com/magazine/article/in-defense_of_the-courts-symposium-finds-no-easy.way-to_
fund-courts/.
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of the judiciary to lobby legislators,"' 4 when members of the judiciary are
paid to do difficult things?
Finally, to suggest that the judiciary does not have a constituency
is, perhaps, the riskiest comment of all. To circulate that remark is to
dismiss the potential constituency by sweeping it from the list of options.
Whereas constituencies are invited to dine along party lines with respect
to legislative and executive loyalties, the judiciary does not automatically
fracture potential support in that way. As a result, the judiciary actually has
the richest potential constituency among the co-equal branches. To hint
otherwise is to disenfranchise the very resource on which the nature of the
judiciary's future depends.
CONCLUSION
The current state court funding crisis is the result of many things. There
is, however, one injuriously overlooked factor that underlies all others: the
judiciary occupies no conversational-presence on the public radar. "The
silence is deafening," the court funding crisis is "not being talked about
around the dinner tables of America." i"5 That silence goes far beyond any
scarcity of civic education, political leverage, or funding. It is bigger than
that. And that lack of notoriety must change.
The task at hand is clear. First, a judicial identity must be established.
Then a presence in the working-knowledge of the citizens must be
developed. From there, public buy-in must be earned. When it is, the
public will become aware of the role of the judiciary, the gravity of what is
at stake, and the necessity for change that will facilitate resilient courts and,
ultimately, resilient justice.
Recent creative efforts point encouragingly in the right direction.
California produced a catchy YouTube announcement that hits the high-
points of the current funding crisis and why judicial funding matters.
1
1
6
The Massachusetts Bar Association commandeered billboards along choice
stretches of heavily traveled interstate.2 7 Even Sesame Street rolled out a
segment featuring United States Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayor
settling a dispute between Baby Bear and Goldilocks.'2 8
124 Id.
125 Id. at 57 (quoting John R. Broderick Jr., Remarks at University of Kentucky
Symposium on State Court Funding (Sept. 23, 2011)).
126 Stand Up for Justice, YoUTu'BE.COM (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.youtube.coml
watch?v=yzhErnUBxyQ.
127 Chris Reidy, MBA Billboard Ads Urge Voters to Support More Funding for the State's
Court System, Bos. GLOBE (Jan. 17, 2012, 9:47 AM), http://www.boston.com/Boston/busines-
supdates/zo z/o i/mba-billboard-ads-urge-voters-support-more-funding-for-the-state-
court-system/pNBYuoQ3jvEeO3Oz824vzI/index.html.
128 Sesame Street: Sonia Sotomayor: "The Justice Hears a Case", YouTuBE.COM (Feb. 3, 2012 ),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FizspmlbAw.
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Numerous ongoing programs deserve continued support. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's iCivics program belongs in every elementary
classroom. 1 9 The majority of State Supreme Court arguments are webcast.
In addition to those examples, efforts to personalize the judiciary must
be taken up with vigor--inside and outside of courts. Kansas' You Be the
Judge program,13 ° and the A.B.A. Least Understood Branch program, 3 ' are
examples of external outreach programs. Inside of courts, jury instructions
can and should be a Constitutional education 3 -- but why stop there?
Courts also can thread the principles of sincerity and presence discussed
here throughout the juror experience, and by doing so, make courts and
jurors comrades, in justice and in life. It is up to courts whether jurors
go home feeling inconvenienced, or feeling enlightened and engaged.
The "buy-in" championed here will require the latter. In fact, until such
connections are commonplace, as courts do increasingly more and budgets
continue ratcheting downward, even the most ingenious reengineering will
be no more effective than rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.
It is imperative that the courts lead by example. Courts must open
the door, extend the hand, recognize the current cramped and warring
socioeconomic demands on citizens and then courts must seek to respond
to those demands. This will not be accomplished through a sense of
importance or owed loyalty, but rather by establishing a presence that is
worthy of respect and relative importance among those concerns. That is
the essence of buy-in and it will only come from public relations.
129 iCivics, http://www.icivics.org/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2o i).
130 Press Release, Joe Pierron, Judge, Kan. Court of Appeals, You be the Judge - The
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132 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Jury Instructions as Constitutional Education: Reclaiming
the Lessons of Jury Service, 84 U. COLO. L.REv._(20I2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=2o 14O89.
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